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Abstract. The game of Diplomacy has been used as a test case for
complex automated negotiations for a long time, but to date very few
successful negotiation algorithms have been implemented for this game.
We have therefore decided to include a Diplomacy tournament within
the annual Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC). In this
paper we present the setup and the results of the ANAC 2017 Diplomacy
Competition and the ANAC 2018 Diplomacy Challenge. We observe that
none of the negotiation algorithms submitted to these two editions have
been able to significantly improve the performance over a non-negotiating
baseline agent. We analyze these algorithms and discuss why it is so
hard to write successful negotiation algorithms for Diplomacy. Finally,
we provide experimental evidence that, despite these results, coalition
formation and coordination do form essential elements of the game.
1 Introduction
Automated negotiations have been studied extensively, but traditionally most
work has focused on the strategy to determine which deals to propose given the
utility values of those deals. A point that has received less attention is the fact
that in many real-world negotiation settings, for any given proposal, a negotiator
would need to spend considerable effort on estimating its value. Only recently,
more attention has been given in the literature to negotiation domains where
the calculation of utility is a highly non-trivial and time-consuming task. For
example, [9] treated a problem in which determining the value of a deal was
NP-hard and in [11] an algorithm was presented for negotiations applied to non-
zero-sum General Game Playing.
The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) is an annually
returning competition that aims to improve the state-of-the-art in automated
negotiations [3]. It was first held in 2010 and has been steadily growing in pop-
ularity. The setup of this competition has been updated each year to reflect the
advancements made in the field of research. While ANAC started with small con-
tract spaces and linear utility functions [4], it has featured increasingly complex
scenarios, involving very large agreement spaces [8], multilateral negotiations [1],
human-agent interactions [13], and non-linear utility functions [8, 2].
However, in all of these editions, the process of evaluating a proposal was ab-
stracted away. The agents would know the value of any potential proposal almost
instantaneously because it could be calculated with a simple linear formula (this
was true even in the editions with non-linear utility functions). Furthermore, the
agents were not required to have any background knowledge of the negotiation
domains and did not need to apply any form of reasoning to obtain the utility
value of a proposal. The utility functions of the agents’ opponents, on the other
hand, were assumed to be completely unknown.
We argue that in real negotiations it is important to have knowledge of the do-
main and one should be able to reason about it. One cannot, for example, expect
to make profitable deals in the antique business without having any knowledge
of antique, no matter how good one is at bargaining. Moreover, a good nego-
tiator should also be able to reason about the desires of its opponents. A good
car salesman, for example, would try to find out what type of car best suits his
client’s needs to increase the chances of making a profitable deal. Therefore, we
envisioned a need to add a new league to ANAC that does involve this kind of
complex reasoning.
The game of Diplomacy forms an excellent test case for this type of complex
negotiations, as it is a game that includes many of the difficulties one would
also have to face in real-life negotiations [6]. It involves constraint satisfaction,
coalition formation, game theory, trust, and even psychology. Now that modern
Chess and Go computers are already far superior to any human player [15], we
expect that Diplomacy will start to draw more attention as the next big challenge
for computer science.
Although the game of Diplomacy has already been under attention of the
Automated Negotiations community for a long time, to date very few successful
negotiating Diplomacy players have been developed. Some of the earliest work
on this game, for example, was presented in [14], but they only managed to play
a very small number of games, because they had to play them with humans.
An informal online community called DAIDE exists which is dedicated to the
development of Diplomacy playing agents.8 Many agents have been developed
by this community but only very few are capable of negotiation. One of the main
non-negotiating bots developed on this framework is called the DumbBot.
In [6] a new platform called DipGame was introduced to make the develop-
ment of Diplomacy agents easier for scientific research. This platform was later
extended into the BANDANA platform [10]. Several negotiating agents have
been developed using DipGame such as DipBlue [7] which consists of a nego-
tiation algorithm built on top of the DumbBot. Unfortunately, its negotiation
algorithm did not result in a very strong increase in performance with respect
to the non-negotiating DumbBot. An entirely new agent was presented in [10],
8 http://www.daide.org.uk
called D-Brane, which can play with or without negotiations. Again, it turned
out that when applying negotiations it is only slightly stronger than when it
plays without negotiating. In 2015 the non-negotiating version of D-Brane won
the Computer Diplomacy Challenge9 which was organized as part of the ICGA
Computer Olympiad.
On the other hand, another negotiation algorithm was implemented on top
of DumbBot [5], which did strongly outperform the non-negotiating DumbBot.
Unfortunately, this agent required a supercomputer to run.
Another negotiating agent, called AlphaDip, was presented in [12], which was
largely based on D-Brane. Although it did improve over D-Brane, the authors
still concluded that adding negotiations to their agent only had a very small
influence on its overall performance.
This paper presents the setup and results of the ANAC 2017 Diplomacy
Competition and the ANAC 2018 Diplomacy Challenge and provides an analysis
of the proposed negotiation strategies for Diplomacy. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the game of Diplomacy while Section 3
explains the negotiation protocol used in this game. Sections 4 and 5 present the
setup and results of the 2017 and 2018 editions respectively. In Section 6 we
present an experiment we conducted to show the importance of cooperation in
Diplomacy. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper with the lessons learned.
2 Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a widely played game for seven players. Just like chess it is com-
pletely deterministic (i.e. there are no dice, cards, or any other source of ran-
domness) and there is no hidden information.10 Players make their moves simul-
taneously. It is designed in such a way that each player needs to negotiate with
the other players in order to have a chance of winning. It can be played as a
classical board game, or it can be played online.11
The game takes place on a map of Europe in the year 1901, which is divided
into 75 Provinces. Each player plays one of the seven great Powers of that time:
Austria (AUS), England (ENG), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Italy (ITA),
Russia (RUS) and Turkey (TUR) and each player starts with three or four units
(armies or fleets) which are placed in fixed initial positions on the map. In each
round of the game, each player must ‘submit an order ’ for each of its units, which
tells those units how to move around the map and allows them to conquer the
map’s provinces.
Some of the Provinces are so-called Supply Centers and the goal for the
players is to conquer those Supply Centers. A player is eliminated when he or
9 https://icga.leidenuniv.nl/?page_id=987
10 One might argue that Diplomacy does have hidden information, because players
make secret agreements. However, these agreements have no formal meaning, and
form part of the players’ strategies rather than of the rules of the game. Therefore,
formally speaking there is no hidden information.
11 http://www.playdiplomacy.com/
she loses all his or her Supply Centers and a player wins the game when he or she
has conquered 18 or more of the 34 Supply Centers (a Solo Victory). However,
the game may also end when all surviving players agree to a draw.
The game iterates through five types of rounds (or ‘phases’), in the following
order: Spring, Summer, Fall, Autumn, Winter. The first round of the game is
referred to as Spring 1901, followed by Summer 1901, etcetera. After Winter
1901 follows Spring 1902, Summer 1902, and so on.
The main difference between Diplomacy and other deterministic games like
Chess and Go, is that in Diplomacy players are allowed to negotiate with each
other and form coalitions. At each round, before the players submit their orders,
the players are given time to negotiate with each other and make agreements
about the orders they will submit. Negotiations take place in private, and each
agreement that is made is only known to the players involved in that agreement.
Typically, players may agree not to invade certain provinces, or they may
agree that one player will help the other player to invade a certain province.
In this way, players essentially form coalitions. These coalitions are not given
beforehand. Instead, during the course of the game players may form and break
coalitions as they like.
3 The Negotiation Protocol
In a real Diplomacy game there are no formal rules for the negotiations. Players
are allowed to negotiate anything and there is no guarantee that players will obey
their agreements. However, for our competition we needed to establish a well-
defined negotiation language and protocol so that the agents could understand
each other. Furthermore, in order to simplify the game and eliminate the issue
of trust, we imposed the rule that the players are always obliged to obey their
agreements. This means that our negotiation language needed to have well-
defined formal semantics, which are explained below.
As the negotiation protocol, we used the Unstructured Negotiation Protocol
[9], because it most closely resembles how negotiations in real games of Diplo-
macy take place. In this protocol, the agents do not take turns, but instead are
allowed to propose or accept a deal whenever they want. A deal may involve any
number of agents. Once all players involved in the deal have accepted it, a special
Notary agent checks whether it is consistent with earlier made agreements. If
this is indeed the case then the Notary will send a confirmation message to all
agents involved in the deal. Once the Notary has sent this confirmation message
the deal is considered officially binding. Players may propose and accept as many
deals as they wish and negotiations continue after a deal has been confirmed.
If an agent has proposed or accepted a deal, but then changes its mind, and
the deal has not yet been confirmed by the Notary, it can send a reject message
to withdraw from the proposal and hence prevent it from becoming confirmed.
However, once the deal is confirmed by the Notary the agents involved must
always obey it.
Since each proposal is only sent to those players that are involved in it the
other players will never be aware that this deal was proposed. Also, the Notary
sends its confirmation message only to the players involved in the deal, so the
agreement remains secret.
3.1 Allowed Proposals
In this section we define the set of deals that agents may propose to each other.
A deal may consist of any number of Order Commitments and any number of
Demilitarized Zones.
Definition 1. An Order Commitment oc is a tuple: oc = (y, φ, o), where y
is a ‘year’ (an integer greater than 1900), φ ∈ {Spring,Fall} is a ‘phase’ and o
is any legal order for any unit.
An Order Commitment represents a promise that a power will submit a certain
order during a certain phase and year. For example: ”In the Spring of 1902
the army in Holland will move to Belgium”. Formally, an Order Commitment
(y, φ, o) is obeyed if Power P submits the order o during phase φ of year y, where
P is the owner of the unit defined by the details of the order o.
Definition 2. A Demilitarized Zone dmz is a tuple: dmz = (y, φ,A,B) with
y and φ as in Def.1, A is a nonempty set of Powers and B is a nonempty set
of Provinces.
A Demilitarized Zone is an agreement between the specified Powers that none
of them will invade (or stay inside) any of the specified Provinces during the
specified phase and year. For example, the Demilitarized Zone
(1903, Fall, {FRA,GER,ENG}, {NTH ,ECH })
has the interpretation “In the Fall of 1903 France, Germany, and England will
keep out of the North Sea and the English Channel”. Formally, a Demilitarized
Zone is obeyed if none of the powers in A submits any order during phase φ of
year y to move any unit into any of the provinces in B.
Definition 3. A Deal d is a non-empty set:
d = {oc1, . . . ocn, dmz1, . . . dmzm}
where each oci is an Order Commitment, each dmzi is a Demilitarized Zone,
and where n and m can be any non-negative integers.
When a deal is confirmed by the Notary it means that all Order Commitments
and all Demilitarized Zones in it must be obeyed.
A proposed deal can only be accepted or rejected in its entirety. If an agent
wishes to accept only a part of the deal, it can simply propose a new deal which
only consists of the subset of Order Commitments and Demilitarized Zones it
desires.
Apart from proposing this type of deals, agents are also allowed to propose
a draw to all other players. The game ends in a draw if all agents that have not
been eliminated propose a draw in the same round of the game.
4 The ANAC 2017 Diplomacy Competition
4.1 Submission Rules and Tournament setup
The assignment for the participants was to implement a negotiation algorithm
using the BANDANA framework. This negotiation algorithm would then be
combined with the tactical module of D-Brane to form a complete agent. This
tactical module would then choose which moves the agent makes, while obeying
the agreements made by the negotiation algorithm. The participants were not
allowed to implement a complete Diplomacy playing agent from scratch. They
were only allowed to implement a negotiation algorithm so that the competition
focused purely on the negotiation aspect of Diplomacy.
In order to determine whether to accept a proposal or not, the participants’
negotiation algorithms had the possibility to consult D-Brane’s Tactical Module
to see which moves would be played if that proposal was accepted.
The tournament was run using the Parlance game server.12 We let all agents
participating in the competition play 110 games together. Since a game requires
7 players and we only had 4 participants, we supplemented the agents with 3
instances of the non-negotiating D-Brane. In each game the players were ran-
domly assigned to the 7 Powers.13 Every round of each game had a deadline of
30 seconds. In order to prevent the games from continuing forever a draw was
declared automatically in any game that advanced to the Winter 1920 phase.
The agents’ overall score for the tournament was determined by the number of
Supply Centers they conquered.
4.2 Submissions
We received the following submissions:
– Frigate, by Ryohei Kawata and Katsuhide Fujita, Tokyo University of Agri-
culture and Technology, Japan
– Agent Madoff, by Tan Hao Hao, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore
– DDAgent, by Daichi Shibata, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan
– NaiveThinkerG, by Giancarlo Nicolo, Universitat Polyte`cnica de Vale`ncia,
Spain
Due to lack of space we cannot give a description of all of these agents.
Therefore, we will only discuss the winner and the runner-up.
12 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/Parlance/1.4.1
13 It would have been better to assign each agent to each Power an equal number of
times, because some Powers are stronger than others. Unfortunately, however, the
Parlance game server does not provide this option.
Frigate Frigate only proposes bilateral deals, and only to Powers that own at
least 3 and at most 10 Supply Centers. Furthermore, it does not deal with any
Power that forms a direct threat to any of Frigate’s own Supply Centers. For
each Power that does qualify Frigate constructs a proposal by consulting the
D-Brane Tactical Module to find the best plans for itself and the other agent,
under the restriction that they do not invade each others’ Supply Centers. The
proposal will then consist of the union of these plans.
Frigate randomly chooses a deal from the proposals it found, where the prob-
ability depends on the strength of the other agent (the weaker the agent, the
higher the probability) and the number of Supply Centers that Frigate expects
to gain from it. Furthermore, the probability is multiplied by 5 if the other agent
is considered an ally. An agent is considered an ally if it was involved in the last
confirmed deal that Frigate was involved in.
Although Frigate does implement an acceptance strategy, due to a bug in
the code, it never accepts any incoming proposals.
Agent Madoff In order to generate proposals Agent Madoff first tries to predict
the opponents’ orders using the D-Brane Tactical Module under the assumption
that the opponents have not made any agreements. Then, it identifies which
orders are in conflict with its own interests, namely orders for units to invade
any of Agent Madoff’s own Home Supply Centers, or any province that Agent
Madoff is also trying to invade. It then tries to find alternative orders for such
units and proposes them. If it cannot find any suitable alternative order then
Agent Madoff will try to ask a third party for support to defend or attack the
province in question.
Agent Madoff does not really apply a coalition formation strategy. However, it
does keep track of each opponent’s ‘hostility’. Initially, it assigns to each Power
has a hostility value of 0. This value is decreased whenever a Power steals a
Supply Center from Agent Madoff, and is increased whenever a Power agrees
to give support to Agent Madoff. This value is then used by Agent Madoff’s
acceptance strategy. The higher this value, the more likely it is that Agent Madoff
will accept a proposal from this opponent.
When Agent Madoff receives a proposal it calculates for each component of
this deal a value between 0 and 1 which depends on various heuristics, such as
the value of the province that is the destination of the order (in case of a move
order commitment), or the hostility of the supported power (in case of a support
order commitment). It then calculates the average value over these components.
The higher this average value, the higher the probability that Agent Madoff will
accept it.
4.3 Results
Initially, we ran the competition according to the setup announced to the par-
ticipants. Unfortunately, no agent performed significantly better than the non-
negotiating D-Brane, which means that the ability to negotiate did not really
improve the results of the agents. We then played 50 games with 4 instances
of each agent versus 3 instances of D-Brane. The idea behind this was that it
might be easier for the agents to negotiate with a copy of themselves, rather
than with a different agent. Unfortunately, this setup also did not result in any
of the players significantly outperforming the others.
Therefore, to decide a winner, we counted the number of proposals made
by each agent that were accepted by every other agent involved in them, and
considered that value as the final score of each agent. The idea being that if
an agent’s proposals are accepted by the other agents, this can be seen as a
measure of quality, even though the agreement did not in the end result in a
higher number of Supply Centers. The results are displayed in Table 1. We see
that Frigate was proclaimed the winner of the competition and Agent Madoff
was awarded the second prize.
Confirmed proposals
Frigate 372
Agent Madoff 170
DDAgent 61
NaiveThinkerG 30
Table 1. Final results of the 2017 Diplomacy Competition. We counted the number
of proposals made by each agent that were eventually accepted by all the other agents
involved in it.
5 The 2018 Diplomacy Challenge
Because the 2017 Diplomacy Competition did not end with one agent being
significantly better than any of the other agents, or even better than the non-
negotiating agent, we decided to change the setup for 2018. Instead of a ‘Com-
petition’ we turned it into a ‘Challenge’, meaning that a winner would only be
proclaimed if its results are significant.
5.1 Tournament Setup
Most of the setup for 2018 was identical to the setup of 2017. We used exactly
the same negotiation protocol, and the participants were again required to im-
plement a negotiation algorithm on top of D-Brane. The main difference was
that the 2018 Challenge consisted of two rounds.
In the first round for each agent we ran 100 games with 4 instances of that
agent against 3 instances of the non-negotiating D-Brane agent. We say an agent
passed the first round if the instances of that agent conquered a statistically
significant higher number of Supply Centers on average than the D-Branes. The
agents that did not pass the first round were eliminated from the Challenge.
For the second round we then let all agents that passed the first round play
together. Since it was likely that there would be less than 7 such agents, we
stated the rule that the field would be supplemented with as many agents that
did not pass the first round as necessary, even though such agents were not
eligible to win the challenge. Furthermore, if there still would not be enough
agents, we would supplement the field with instances of the non-negotiating D-
Brane agent. We played 100 games and the agent that conquered the highest
number of Supply Centers would be the winner of Round 2.
In order to win the Challenge an agent had to win the second round, as well
as pass the first round. This means that if the winner of the second round did
not pass the first round there would be no winner at all.
5.2 Motivation
The motivation behind this setup is that in Round 2 the real negotiation skills of
the agents are tested. In theory, if an agent makes purely selfish proposals, it will
not succeed, because its proposals will not be accepted by the other agents. On
the other hand, if it makes purely altruistic proposals or accepts any proposal it
receives, it will not succeed either, because it will be exploited by its opponents.
In practice, however, a bad negotiator could still be able to win Round 2, because
its opponents are not perfect either and therefore it might purely benefit from
bad proposals made by the other agents. In order to prevent such ‘freeloading’
behavior we demanded that each agent was also able to successfully negotiate
with only copies of itself. For this reason we have included Round 1 in this
challenge. One could also roughly say that Round 1 tests the agents’ ‘proposing
strategy’, while Round 2 tests their ‘acceptance strategy’.
5.3 Submissions
We received the following submissions:
– CoalitionBot, by Ido Westler, Yehuda Callen, Moche Uzan, Arie Cattan,
Avishay Zagury Bar Ilan University, Israel
– M@sterMind, by Jonathan Ng, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore
– Gunma, by Ryohei Kawata and Katsuhide Fujita,Tokyo University of Agri-
culture and Technology, Japan
– GamlBot, by Michael Vassernis, Bar Ilan University, Israel
– DDAgent2, by Daichi Shibata, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan
Unfortunately, it turned out that DDAgent2 was too slow to participate, because
in many rounds it was not able to submit its orders before the deadline.
Again, due to space constraints we will only discuss the two best agents of
the two respective rounds.
CoalitionBot CoalitionBot is a very passive player. It only proposes demilita-
rized zones and it accepts any incoming proposal. In the first turn, it proposes a
bilateral deal to every other Power. This deal proposes that the other Power will
not invade any of the CoalitionBot’s own supply Centers during the current turn,
and in return the CoalitionBot will not invade the other power’s Supply Centers
during the same turn. Any agent that accepts this proposal will be considered
an ally for the rest of the game. In all other turns, CoalitionBot proposes to all
its allies that they will not attack each others’ Supply Centers.
We will see below that CoalitionBot was able to perform strongly in the
first round, but not in the second round. This is not surprising, given that it
always accepts any incoming proposal and does not try to exploit its opponents.
Its implementation seems to be based on the idea that it can always completely
trust its opponents. Clearly, this works well when playing against copies of itself,
but not when playing against less altruistic opponents.
Gunma Gunma proposes two types of deals, which the authors call a ‘Mutual
Support’ and a ‘Combined Attack’, respectively. A Mutual Support is a deal in
which one unit of Gunma supports an opponent’s unit to hold, and the oppo-
nent’s unit supports Gunma’s unit to hold in return. A Combined Attack is a
deal in which one of Gunma’s units attacks a province owned by an enemy, with
support from as many units from allies as possible. Whenever Gunma can find
a Combined Attack, it will propose it. On the other hand, it will only propose a
Mutual Support if it finds one for which it is sure it can gain a Supply Center.
For any received proposal Gunma predicts how many Supply Centers it would
gain from it. It accepts the deal that yields the highest gain, but if there are
multiple such deals, it uses the current number of supply centers owned by the
proposer as a tie-breaker. In that case it will accept the deal from the currently
weakest Power.
Note that Gunma’s proposing strategy is rather greedy. It only proposes deals
that yield benefit to himself, and never considers the needs of its negotiation
partners. When it comes to accepting, however, it is less selfish. If no deal yields
any gain, than it is willing to accept a deal that does not cause Gunma to lose
any Supply Centers.
5.4 Results
The Results of Round 1 are displayed in Table 2. We see that only CoalitionBot
and Gunma were able to outperform D-Brane. However, a one-sided Student-t
test14 revealed that the results of Gunma were not significant (p-value 0.23).
Therefore, only CoalitionBot managed to pass Round 1 (p-value 9.7 · 10−9).
The results of Round 2 are shown in Table 3. As explained above, we needed
to include all the agents in this round, as well as 3 instances of D-Brane, in
14 With respect to the null-hypothesis that each agent has a mean score of 34
7
Supply
Centers per game.
Sup. Centers Result
CoalitionBot 5.528 ± 0.110 PASS
D-Brane 3.963 ± 0.146
Gunma 4.950 ± 0.128 FAIL
D-Brane 4.733 ± 0.171
D-Brane 4.930 ± 0.164
M@sterMind 4.803 ± 0.123 FAIL
D-Brane 5.440 ± 0.184
GamlBot 4.420 ± 0.138 FAIL
Table 2. Results of the 2018 Diplo-
macy Challenge, Round 1. Displayed
are the average number of conquered
supply centers per game, with their
standard errors.
Supply Centers
Gunma 5.69 ± 0.300
GamlBot 5.31 ± 0.334
CoalitionBot 4.94 ± 0.289
D-Brane 4.54 ± 0.157
M@sterMind 4.44 ± 0.290
Table 3. Results of the 2018 Diplo-
macy Challenge, Round 2. Gunma
scores highest, but the results are not
significant.
order to have 7 players, even though CoalitionBot was the only agent that passed
Round 1 and therefore the only candidate to win the challenge.
We see that Gunma performed best, although the difference between the
first three agents is non-significant. Since the CoalitionBot did not beat the
other agents in Round 2, and it was not able to clearly outperform the D-Brane
in this round either, the 2018 Diplomacy Challenge ended with no winner.
6 Is Cooperation even Possible?
One question that may come to mind when looking at the results, is whether
it is really possible at all to improve performance by means of negotiation. Any
experienced Diplomacy player would answer this question with a definite ‘yes’,
but we would like to back this claim up with scientific evidence.
The question is then how we could show that it is possible to negotiate
successfully, without having any algorithm that can do this to our disposal.
Fortunately, we have managed to design an experiment that allows us to show
the benefit of cooperation, without actually using a negotiation algorithm.
It worked as follows. We first let 7 instances of the non-negotiating D-Brane
play 200 games and recorded how many Supply Centers each Power conquered on
average. The results are displayed in Table 4. Next, we repeated this experiment,
but with only 6 instances of D-Brane while one of those agents was playing two
Powers at the same time. For each possible combination of two Powers we played
200 games (there are
(
7
2
)
= 21 such combinations, so we played 21 · 200 = 4200
games) and recorded the number of Supply Centers conquered by the agent
playing two Powers.
In this way we have been able to show that if one agent plays the role of two
Powers at once, it scores more Supply Centers than if two agents individually
play the same two Powers. In other words, when two Powers work together as
a team, they have a clear advantage. These results are displayed in Table 5.
For example, in the first row we see that when AUS and ENG are played by
one agent, then that agent scores on average 6.99 Supply Centers. However, we
see in Table 4 that when these Powers are played by individual agents, they
only score 1.60 and 4.39 Supply Centers respectively, yielding a total score of
1.60 + 4.39 = 5.99, which is also displayed in the first row of Table 5.
The combination of AUS and ENG only yields a small advantage, but for
many other coalitions we see much stronger synergy effects. For example, FRA
and GER together score 22.1 Supply Centers when played by a single agent,
while when playing individually they only score15 4.98 + 4.11 = 9.09.
In general, we see a clear advantage in 12 out of the 21 possible combina-
tions (more than 4 Supply Centers difference, indicated with ++) and a small
advantage in 4 of those combinations (indicated with +). When we calculate the
average over all combinations we find that the agent playing two Powers scores
around 14 Supply Centers, which is clearly more than the 27 · 34 = 9.71 Supply
Centers that two individual agents would conquer on average.
Although it is clear that players have an advantage when cooperating, we also
conclude that this highly depends on which two Powers are forming a coalition.
FRA and GER, for example, form a much stronger coalition than AUS and ENG.
This is an important observation, because this may also explain why it is hard for
the submitted agents to negotiate successfully. In many games the negotiating
agents may be assigned to Powers that do not form strong combinations, making
it hard to benefit from negotiation.
The fact that some coalitions are stronger than others is well-known among
experienced Diplomacy players, and is a consequence of the topology of the map.
For example, Russia and Turkey are two bordering Powers, which means that if
they form a coalition at the beginning of the game then each of them does not
have to worry about being attacked by the other, and can therefore completely
focus on its other direct neighbors. Furthermore, the fact that they are located
next to each other means they can easily give support to one another.
On the other hand, Turkey and England form a weak coalition because they
are positioned on opposite ends of the map, so they cannot attack each other in
early stages of the game, which means they would not benefit from any mutual
peace agreement, and they cannot give each other support either.
For some coalitions we even see a detrimental effect. Although in most cases
they are relatively small, they cannot be attributed to statistical fluctuations.
We suspect that this results from the fact that they play different opening moves
when playing together, which coincidentally happen to be worse.
Finally, we should note that the difference in strength between the various
coalitions may not only be caused by the topology of the map, but may also
partially be a consequence of the strategy applied by D-Brane. Therefore, we
expect these results to be different, but not radically different, if we repeated
this experiment with a different agent.
15 Table 5 shows a value of 9.08 instead of 9.09. This difference is due to rounding
errors.
We conclude from these experiments that it should definitely be possible for
two agents to benefit from negotiations. Interestingly, these results also suggest
how such a negotiation algorithm could be implemented. The idea is that if our
agent is playing, for example, FRA, then it could consult the D-Brane Tactical
module to ask which moves it should play if it were playing as both FRA and
GER. Then, it could propose those moves to GER.
Power Supply Centers
AUS 1.60 ± 0.16
ENG 4.39 ± 0.17
FRA 4.98 ± 0.20
GER 4.11 ± 0.24
Power Supply Centers
ITA 2.41 ± 0.16
RUS 10.44 ± 0.42
TUR 6.09 ± 0.17
Table 4. The number of Supply Centers conquered by each Power, when 7 instances
of D-Brane are playing without negotiations
Coalition Score by Score by
of 2 Powers 1 agent 2 agents
AUS + ENG 6.99 5.99 +
AUS + FRA 9.91 6.57 +
AUS + GER 4.11 5.7 –
AUS + ITA 12.91 4.01 ++
AUS + RUS 17.61 12.03 ++
AUS + TUR 17.95 7.69 ++
ENG + FRA 17.95 9.37 ++
ENG + GER 17.78 8.50 ++
ENG + ITA 8.88 6.8 +
ENG + RUS 20.37 14.83 ++
ENG + TUR 8.82 10.48 –
Coalition Score by Score by
of 2 Powers 1 agent 2 agents
FRA + GER 22.1 9.08 ++
FRA + ITA 13.43 7.39 ++
FRA + RUS 9.91 15.41 – –
FRA + TUR 8.71 11.07 –
GER + ITA 11.7 6.52 ++
GER + RUS 21.27 14.54 ++
GER + TUR 8.99 10.20 –
ITA + RUS 19.21 12.85 ++
ITA + TUR 11.92 8.5 +
RUS + TUR 24.34 16.53 ++
Overall 14.04 9.71 ++
Table 5. The number of Supply Centers conquered by each combination of two Powers
played by one agent, compared to their score when played by two agents. Differences
greater than 4 Supply Center are indicated with ++ or – –, while smaller differences
are indicated with + or –. In all cases except AUS+ENG, AUS+GER and GER+TUR
the p−value was smaller than 10−4.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
From these two competitions we have learned that it is still very hard for the
Automated Negotiations community to implement algorithms for domains as
complex as Diplomacy. So far, no submission has been able to significantly out-
perform a non-negotiating agent, even though we have experimentally shown
that it is definitely possible for agents to benefit from cooperation.
However, it is important to understand that we are not expecting the Diplo-
macy Challenge to have a winner any time soon. We regard it as a long term
challenge which might take several years to tackle. After all, in the cases of
Chess, Go, and Poker it also took many years to develop strong programs.
Diplomacy is a very complex game and it is hard for participants to write a
strong algorithm in the few months they have between the call for participation
and the submission deadline. Before they could even start implementing they
first needed to learn the rules of the game (which are fairly complex), learn
the rules of the competition, and learn to work with the BANDANA framework.
After that, they needed to come up with a smart algorithm, implement it, debug
it, and optimize it.
Studying the source codes of the agents, we made two important observations:
1. Most agents never make any proposals for any of the future turns. They only
make proposals for the current turn.
2. Many of the agents seem to have bugs in their code.
We think that both of these observations play an important role in the reason
why the agents fail to negotiate successfully.
Any experienced Diplomacy player would agree that it is essential to plan
several steps ahead. An important reason for this is that one does not often
encounter a situation in which two players can both directly benefit from coop-
eration. Although it often happens that one player can give support to another
player, it may then take several turns before a situation occurs in which the other
player can return the favor. Therefore, it is essential that, in the short term, play-
ers are not purely selfish. They should be willing to help another player, while
only expecting the favor to be returned at a later stage. Currently, none of the
submitted agents seem to exhibit this kind of long term negotiation strategy.
Similarly, we think that the second observation is a very important one. As
explained, the participants only have a limited amount of time to implement
their agents, so perhaps we can only expect any participant to win the challenge
after participating for several years. We noticed, for example, that due to a
bug Frigate never accepted any proposals, even though it did implement an
acceptance strategy. Also, Agent Madoff was more likely to accept a proposal
if it involved a unit invading a province currently occupied by a Power that is
considered a friend. We think that this is an error and that the author intended
the opposite. Luckily, we see that two participants from 2017 have continued
to participate in 2018, so the necessary drive seems to exist to commit to this
long-term challenge.
In future editions of the Diplomacy Challenge, whenever negotiating agents
play together with non-negotiating agents, we may need to make sure the nego-
tiating agents play Powers that are more likely to form successful coalitions, as
indicated by our experiments in Section 6.
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